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While corporate UK was strongly opposed to Brexit, their strategies tell a slightly different
story, write Michael Mayer, Julia Hautz, Christian Stadler and Richard Whittington.
In contrast to their European counterparts, British businesses have long looked for
markets primarily outside of Europe.
Always good to start with a confession: we are what Brexiteers call Remoaners. As
Michael Bloomberg says, “it is really hard to understand why a country that was doing so
well wanted to ruin it.” Anti-immigration sentiments, a feeling of being left behind by many
voters, an uninspiring campaign by the Remain side, and decades of ‘blame it on
Europe’ by both Tory politicians (including David Cameron) and tabloids are obvious
reasons. No plausible economic explanation, however, has been put forward so far.
This is where our research on European firms offers new insights. While corporate UK
was strongly opposed to leaving the European Union, their strategies tell a slightly
different story. To untangle fundamental differences in national patterns of organisation,
we followed previous scholars who looked at changes in diversification and
internationalisation – the two fundamental dimensions of corporate strategy. We
collected 1993-2010 data for 5,415 firms in France, Germany and the United Kingdom,
as well as the mid-sized northern and southern European economies of Sweden,
Finland, Italy, and Spain. Our data covers all publicly listed non-financial firms.
The Gherkin, by Tom (CC-BY-NC-SA-2.0)
In a nutshell, UK firms follow the general European trend in diversification, namely
reducing it. Their approach to internationalisation is, however, very different. In contrast
to their European counterparts they look for markets primarily outside of Europe. Clearly,
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they are not as impressed by the opportunities created within Europe by the twin policies
of market liberalization and harmonisation, which are intended to increase the global
competitiveness of European firms.
Take the two defence contractors Thales and BAE Systems. The former is French, the
latter British. State-owned Thales had an explicit European growth strategy dating back
to the 1980’s. Thales was born when its predecessor Thomson-CSF took over the
defence electronics activities of Philips and acquired UK’s Racal Electronics. Between
1993 and 2007, foreign sales in Europe jumped from 27 per cent to 57 per cent, while
foreign sales outside Europe dropped from 39 per cent to 17 per cent.
BAE Systems seemed, at first, to go down a similar path. In 1995, British Aerospace and
Germany’s DASA had plans to form a strong European champion to counter the
dominance of U.S. defence contractors. Instead, the British company decided to merge
with UK’s Marconi Electronic Systems in 1999. Growth in Europe was not rejected per
se, but opportunities in the United States were simply too attractive. By 2004, further
European acquisitions or joint ventures were ruled out altogether. Between 1993 and
2007, sales outside Europe hence increased from 38 to 66 per cent while those in
Europe declined from 28 to 12 per cent.
Let’s take a look at the overall numbers. Between the early 1990s and the immediate
aftermath of the global financial crisis, British intra-European sales fluctuated around 7 to
8 per cent of total sales. German firms doubled their intra-European sales from about 10
to 20 per cent. For firms from other European countries, the growth of intra-European
sales was not quite so dramatic, but even Spanish and Italian firms were above 15 per
cent, proportionally selling twice as much in Europe than British firms.
Rather than bringing British firms closer to continental Europe, European integration
appears to have pushed them to look elsewhere. Although by 2010 the sales of British
firms outside of Europe were similar to those of their German and French counterparts –
at around 24 per cent – this involved some catching up from a comparatively low base of
13 per cent. For the 100 largest firms, the pattern was even more pronounced. Sales in
Europe declined from 21 to 12 per cent of total sales, while they grew from 29 to 55 per
cent outside Europe.
The distinctiveness of British internationalisation is, in a sense, Brexit foretold. History, as
well as the images we associate with it, should not be underestimated here. While a
British business tycoon will think of Rudyard Kipling’s India when a deal in the
subcontinent is proposed, pictures of Stalin’s communist regime will cloud their thinking
over a similar proposal stemming from Hungary.
A yet unanswered question is whether the distinct path that British business has taken
since the early 1990s will help it to master the challenges of Brexit. A natural experiment
in the making.
_____
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Note: This post was originally published at our sister site, LSE Business Review. It is
based on the authors’ published work.
About the Authors
Michael Mayer is Professor of Strategic Management and Head of the
Strategy and Organisation Division at the University of Bath, School of
Management. He has held appointments at the Universities of Glasgow
and Edinburgh. He is interested in understanding how strategies and
associated processes and practices interact with the wider societal and
institutional context.
Julia Hautz is an assistant professor of strategic corporate governance
and leadership at Innsbruck University, Austria. Her research interests
are in corporate strategies: product diversification and international
diversification; open innovation and open strategy; online communities
and social networks; and quantitative methods.
 
Christian Stadler is a professor of strategic management at Warwick
Business School. For the past decade he has investigated long-living
corporations – how they grow, adapt, and consistently beat their
competitors. He has been widely quoted in the media. His book
“Enduring Success: What We Can Learn from the History of
Outstanding Corporations” is the first one with a non-U.S. perspective
on long-range success. Thinkers50 listed him as a future thinker in 2013.
Richard Whittington is professor of strategic management at Saïd
Business School and Millman Fellow in Management at New College,
Oxford. He is a leader in the field of strategy-as-practice research,
having published the first paper in the field (1996). The strategy-as-
practice movement has revitalised research on strategic planning.
Richard’s own research is exploring the recent ‘opening’ of strategy. He
has written two textbooks, and his research is widely featured in the
news media.
 
All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of
LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political
Science. 
3/3
